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I. INTRODUCTION

This article began as a short presentation for the 2008 International Law
Weekend in New York City. As I reviewed the ten private international law
developments I had chosen for that presentation, it became clear that most of
them reflected a much more important cumulative process that has developed
over the past decade. The continuing evolution of that process in 2008 provides
contrast between the centralization of private international law competence in
the European Union (E.U.) and the apparent parallel dispersal of law making
authority (particularly in regard to treaty implementation) in the United States.
As a federal system has developed in the E.U., European Community
institutions have replaced the Member States as the primary sources of rules of
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private international law, both internally and externally.' At the same time,
some have claimed for the states of the United States an enhanced role in the
development of external private international law rules for the United States,
arguably assisted by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. This
reversal of functions on both sides of the Atlantic has the potential to diminish
the role of the United States and enhance the role of the European Community
as global players in the development of private international law.
II. DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL SCOPE OF 2008 DEVELOPMENTS

The term "private international law" has a number of meanings. In the
traditional continental civil law system, as well as in the common law system
in the United Kingdom (U.K.), it generally is taken to cover three areas
important to cross-border litigation: jurisdiction, the determination of
applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.2 In the
United States, this combination of issues is addressed under the rubric of
conflict of laws, often limiting consideration to internal cross-border matters.3
At the same time, in the United States we tend to define the term private
international law more broadly by reference to the work of the Office of Private
International Law within the Office of Legal Adviser at the Department of

I. Currently, the European Union has no institutional framework. The European Community,
under the Treaty Establishing the European Community, is the source of institutions that create legal
instruments and participate in external relations. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the "European Union" would
replace the "European Community," and the Treaty establishing the European Community would be renamed
the Treaty on the functioning of the Union. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, December 3, 2007,2008 O.J. (C306) 1, available at
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cgO0014.en07.pdf(last visited Feb. 21, 2009). The negative
vote on the Irish referendum on June 12, 2008 has left implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon uncertain.
2.

See, e.g., CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 ( (P.M. North & J.J.

Fawcett, eds., 13th ed, 1999):
Private international law is that part of English law which comes into operation
whenever the court is faced with a claim that contains a foreign element. It is only
when this element is present that private international law has a function to perform.
It has three main objects.
First, to prescribe the conditions under which the court is competent to entertain
such a claim.
Secondly, to determine for each class of case the particular municipal system
of law by reference to which the rights of the parties must be ascertained.
Thirdly, to specify the circumstances in which (a) a foreign judgment can be
recognised as decisive of the question in dispute; and (b) the right vested in the
judgment creditor by a foreign judgment can be enforced by action in England.
Id.
3.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAwS (1971).
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State.4 Within the American Society of International Law, the Interest Group
on Private International Law similarly has taken a broad approach to defining
the term.
However we define the term, the most significant development in private
international law over the past decade has been the entry of institutions of the
European Community into the field. The Member States of the E.U. have been
major participants in the process of defining the rules of private international
law through treaties such as the Brussels, Lugano, and Rome Conventions, as
well as through their national rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, and the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The amendments to the
European Community Treaty brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam gave
Community institutions direct authority for developments in the areas of
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments, and applicable law.6
This has made the development of private international law largely a matter
internal to the Community institutions, and most particularly within the
Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security of the European
Commission.7 Since the effective date of the Amsterdam Treaty amendments
on May 1, 1999, there has been no lack of effort to centralize Community rules
on private international law through Community Regulations.'

4.
This scope of coverage is reflected on the website of the United States Department of State,
Office of the Legal Adviser, Private International Law, availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/l/c3452.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009). "PL" in the Legal Adviser's office represents the United States in negotiations at
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, availableat www.hcch.net (last visited Feb. 21, 2009),
UNCITRAL, available at www.uncitral.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2009), UNIDROIT available at www.
unidroit.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2009), and the OAS, available at http://www.oas.org/DIL/private_
internationallaw.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
5.

See, e.g., Louise Tsang, PrivateInternationalLaw, at VI., ASIL ELECTRONIC RESOURCE GUIDE,

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW INTHE UNITED STATES, availableat http://www.asil.org/pill .cfm#Private%20

Intemational%2OLaw/o20in%20the%20United%20States (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
6.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts. 61-67, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C325)
I [hereinafter TEC]. See Aude Fiorini, The Evolution ofEuropean PrivateInternationalLaw, 57 INT'L
COMP. L.Q. 969 (2008) ("The Treaty of Amsterdam... radically reformed the position and status of private
international law, bringing it within the ambit of first pillar competence."). Id.
7.
See generally Justice and Home Affairs, European Commission, Judicial Co-Operation
Between Member States in Civil and CommercialMatters is a European Community Policy Linked to the
Free CirculationofPeople, EUROPA, Mar., 2005, availableat http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/civi Vfsj_
civilintroen.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Judicial Co-Operation].
8.
For discussion of these developments in the European Union, see Ronald A. Brand, Balancing
Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in PrivateInternationalLaw: Regression at the European Court of
Justice, in LIBER MEMORIALIS PETAR SARCEVIC: UNIVERsAISM, TRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL 35, 45

(2006) [hereinafter Brand]; Ronald A. Brand, FederalismandtheAllocation ofSovereignty Beyondthe State
in the EuropeanUnion, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 76 (2005); Ronald A. Brand, The European Union's New Role
in InternationalPrivate Litigation, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 277, 285 (2005).
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In the discussion that follows, I note ten developments in private international law of the past year which I find to be worthy of interest. They reflect
the heavy influence of European Community legislation and adjudication. My
choices are not necessarily based on those individual events that will have the
most significant impact on future legal relationships-nor is the list exhaustive
of all developments during the past year. In some instances, the developments
represent (I hope) possible departures from consistent future evolution. In each
case, however, they are legal events worth the attention of private international
lawyers. There is not space here to provide analysis of each development in
full detail. My intent is rather to provide enough information that those who
wish to know more may knowledgably consult the texts that relate to each
development.
My list begins with developments within the E.U., and more specifically
with two regulations of the European Council and Parliament. More important
than those two instruments, however, is the general leadership role the
European Community has assumed in private international law. This leadership
extends beyond the new Community competence in private international law.
Many other nations find the roots of their private law and private international
law systems in the continental civil law traditions, often as a result of
transplantation of European legal codes. This means that developments in
Europe are likely to have significant influence on developments throughout the
world. This heightened influence of the E.U. has accompanied the recent
decline in the influence of the United States in international law generally,
making Europe's role even more significant. When the European Community
became a member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on
March 3, 2007, 9 this role took on formal status in one of the three major
institutions for the negotiation of multilateral legal instruments on private
international law and international private law."
IH. THE TEN DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Rome II Regulation
On January 11, 2009, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual

9.
See Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), HCCH Members,
http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=states.details&sid=220 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) (information on
European Community membership).
10.
These institutions are the Hague Conference on Private International Law available at
www.hcch.net, UNC1TRAL available at www.uncitral.org, and the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law available at www.unidroit.org.
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obligations, known as the "Rome H" Regulation, will take effect." While it
was completed and adopted on July 11, 2007, Member States were given the
ability, until July 11, 2008, to list conventions and agreements with nonMember States that might have rules conflicting with the Rome H Regulation,
and for which continued operation would remain important.
The Rome II Regulation provides the rules on applicable law that will
govern in the courts of all Member States of the E.U. for matters dealing with
obligations incurred other than by contract. This will include tort and delict
actions, products liability, unfair competition, and claims for environmental
damage or the infringement of intellectual property rights.
While the Brussels I Regulation,' 2 as interpreted by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), provides that jurisdiction for matters arising in tort shall exist in
both the courts of the state in which the act causing injury occurred and the
state in which the injury arose, 13 the Rome H Regulation logically provides for
a single applicable law in tort. That law is "the law of the country in which the
damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the
damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the
indirect consequences of that event occur."' 4 Articles dealing with specific
types of actions provide corresponding rules, unifying the rules on applicable
law throughout the E.U. on such matters.
The Rome HRegulation set the stage for the Rome I Regulation, discussed
below, and follows Regulations on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement ofjudgments, service of process, taking of evidence, insolvency,
small claims, and other areas of judicial cooperation.' 5 Together, this set of
instruments demonstrates substantial centralization of private international
functions within the Community institutions.
B. The Rome I Regulation
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome
I) was issued on June 17, 2008,16 and will apply to contracts concluded after
December 17, 2009."7 This Regulation completes the package of basic private
11.

Council Regulation 864/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC) [hereinafter Rome HRegulation].

For more on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
12.
commercial matters, see Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I
Regulation].
13.

Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1741.

14.

Rome H Regulation, supra note 11, art. 4(1).

15.

See generallyJudicial Co-Operation,supra note 7.

16.

Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EC) [hereinafter Rome Regulation 1].

17.

Id. at art. 28.
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international law instruments through internal Community legislation, with the
Brussels I and II Regulations providing rules for jurisdiction and for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and the Rome I and II Regulations
providing rules of applicable law for contractual obligations and non-contractual obligations, respectively.
The fundamental rule of Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation provides for
party autonomy, stating that "[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen
by the parties."' 8 This rule gives way, however, to mandatory rules of a country
other than the country of the chosen law, when "all other elements relevant to
the situation at the time of the choice are located" in that other country.' 9 It also
is preempted by mandatory rules of Community law when the parties have
chosen the law of a non-Member State and the forum is a court in a Member
State.2" If no law is chosen by the parties, then Article 4 provides that, in the
most common situations:
1)
2)

A contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of
the country where the seller has his habitual residence;2' and
A contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the
law of the country where the service provider has his habitual
residence.22

Like the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and judgments, the Rome I
Regulation contains special rules for consumer, employment, and insurance
contracts, designed to protect the party commonly considered to have the lesser
bargaining power in the relationship. This follows the more paternalistic
approach of civil law systems, generally, and departs from the more economicoriented approach for similar rules in the United States and some other common
law countries.
The Rome I Regulation is particularly important because it makes clear the
exercise of Community authority over questions of applicable law, and brings
matters that arguably were not clearly allocated to Community competence
23
within the realm of internal legislation of the Community.
18.

Id. at art. 3(l).

19.

Id. at art. 3(3).

20.

Id. at art. 3(4).

21.

Rome Regulation , supra note 16, at art. 4(l)(a).

22.

Id. at art. 4(l)(b).

23.

The TEC provides that:
Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border
implications, to be taken in accordance with Article 67 and insofar as necessary for the
proper functioning of the internal market, shall
include:
a)
improving and simplifying: the system for cross-border service of
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C. The West Tankers Opinion ofAdvocate GeneralKokott24
While the European Court of Justice had not yet rendered its opinion at the
time of this writing, the Advocate General's opinion in West Tankers is
important and raises interesting questions regarding 1) the application of the
Brussels I Regulation in a manner that clearly elevates the civil law doctrine of
lis pendens further over common law doctrines concerning parallel litigation;
and 2) the future relationship between litigation and arbitration-in particular
the continued application of fundamental doctrines of arbitration law.
The West Tankers case was generated when a vessel owned by West
Tankers collided with a jetty in Syracuse, Italy. 25 The charter party under
which the vessel was operating contained an arbitration agreement providing
that all disputes arising from the contract were to be dealt with by arbitration
in London, applying English law. 26 The owner of the jetty claimed damages
against West Tankers for its uninsured losses in arbitration proceedings in
London, and the insurers brought proceedings against West Tankers in Italy to
recover the amounts which they had paid the jetty owners under the insurance
policies.27 West Tankers later instituted proceedings before the High Court in
London against the insurance carrier and others, seeking both a declaration that

judicial and extrajudicial documents; cooperation in the taking of
evidence; the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and
commercial cases, including decisions in extrajudicial cases;
b)
promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States
concerning the conflict of laws and ofjurisdiction;
c)
eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if
necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure
applicable in the Member States.
It was, perhaps, arguable that language of subparagraph (b) ("promoting") was merely
hortatory in comparison to the more direct "improving and simplifying" language of
subparagraph (a). This distinction seems not to have made a difference in the
instruments promulgated under the authority of Article 67.
TEC, supra note 6, at art. 67.
24.
For a preliminary ruling from the House of Lords, see Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., Case
C-185/07 (U.K.). Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on Sept. 4, 2008, in Case C-185/07, in
Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica Di Sicurta SpA) and Others v. West Tankers Inc. (Reference for
a preliminary ruling from the House of Lords (United Kingdom)). The West Tankers case was decided by
the European Court of Justice (subsequent to the writing of this article) on Feb. 10, 2009. Thejudgment is
availableathttp://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=Rechercher$docrequire=alldocs
&numafflC-l 85/07&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax= 100 (last visited Mar. 27,
2009) [hereinafter Allianz SpA].
25.
See West Tankers Inc. v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [20071 UKHL 4, 2 (U.K.),
in which the House of Lords referred the case to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
26.

Id.

27.

Id.
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the Italian proceedings were properly the subject of arbitration, and an
injunction in favor of arbitration restraining the insurance carrier from further
litigation in Italy (on the grounds that the insurer now had succeeded to the
position of the charterer and was bound by the28arbitration clause as a result of
having paid the obligations under the policy).
Advocat General Kokott concluded her opinion with a recommendation
that the Court of Justice answer the reference to it from the House of Lords by
concluding that the Brussels I Regulation "precludes a court of a Member State
from making an order restraining a person from commencing or continuing
proceedings before the courts of another Member State because, in the opinion
of the court, such proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement., 29 Her
analysis raises important questions both about the European Court's
jurisprudence regarding parallel proceedings and about the relationship between
litigation and arbitration in the E.U..
The opinion begins with reference to two important prior ECJ cases on
parallel proceedings. In Gasser," the Court reviewed the Article 21 lispendens
rule of the Brussels Convention (now found in Article 27 of the Brussels
Regulation), concluding that,
[e]ven if the proceedings to determine jurisdiction before the court
first seised are very protracted and may have been brought there only
in order to delay proceedings, the Court refused to make exceptions
to the lis pendens rule. The court first seised must examine its jurisdiction itself. Only if that court declines jurisdiction may the court
seised subsequently continue the proceedings pending before it.31
In Turner,32 the Court held that the Article 21 lis pendens rule of the
Brussels Convention requires proceedings in the court first seised and
"precludes the imposition of an anti-suit injunction in connection with
proceedings before the court of another Member State, even where the
proceedings abroad are brought by a party in bad faith with a view to frustrating
the existing proceedings. 33 This combination of decisions provides the
foundation for a strict preference for the civil law doctrine of lis alibipendens,
which favors a race to the courthouse and jurisdiction residing with the court
first seised, over the common law preference for parallel proceedings and

28.

Id. at 3.

29.

Allianz SpA, supra note 24, 1 74.

30.

Case C- 116/02, Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Sri., 2003 E.C.R. 1-14693.

31.

Allianz SpA, supra note 24,

32.

Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3565.

33.

See Allianz SpA, supra note 24, 1 23.

25.
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discretionary doctrines allowing deferral to a court later seised (forum non
conveniens), or the issuance of an anti-suit injunction against parties proceeding
in other courts.34 Advocate General Kokott found the important question in
West Tankers to be "whether the principles set out in Turner can be applied to
anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration proceedings."35 Subsidiarily, in
applying the Brussels Convention's exclusion from scope of arbitration
proceedings, she determined that "the decisive question is not whether the
application for an anti-suit injunction-in this case, the proceedings before the
English courts-falls within the scope of application of the Regulation, but
whether the proceedings against which the anti-suit injunction is directed-the
proceedings before the court in [Italy]-do so."36 Thus, an agreement of the
parties to decide all disputes by arbitration does not necessarily remove their
later efforts at dispute resolution from the Brussels I Regulation if one of them
takes a matter to the courts with a focus on substantive claims between the
parties rather than on the agreement to arbitrate; and arbitration of such claims
may be circumvented through such preemptory litigation.
While Advocate General Kokott acknowledged that "the parties to the
Brussels Convention... wished to exclude arbitration in its entirety" from the
scope of the Convention,37 she concluded that the decision whether the parties
have decided to submit a specific matter to arbitration is for the court; the
existence and applicability of the arbitration clause merely constitute a
preliminary issue which the court seised must address when examining whether
it has jurisdiction.3"
She then provided an interesting reading of Article H (3) of the New York
Arbitration Convention. The language of Article II (3) states:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter
in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the
meaning of this article, at the request of one of the parties, refer the
parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.39

34.
8, at49.

For a discussion of the European Court's earlier decisions in this area, see Brand, supra note

35.

Allianz SpA, supra note 24,

36.

Id. 33.

37.

Id. 1 47.

38.

Id. 54.

27.

39.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 11(3), June
10, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
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Advocate General Kokott concluded that this provision is to be applied to
allow a court not to send the partiesto arbitrationunless it first finds that the
subject matter of the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration, the parties
have agreed to arbitration, and the agreement is not null and void.4" Turning a
positive statement in favor of arbitration into a negative limitation on arbitration
may continue the jurisprudence on the Brussels I Regulation, but it creates
difficult relationships between the Regulation and the New York Convention.
In her opinion, the Advocate General uses language now used most often
to support the determination ofjurisdiction by arbitration tribunals and applies
it instead to courts, thus making reference to "the general principle that every
court is entitled to examine its own jurisdiction (doctrine of KompetenzKompetenz)."' While a court certainly does have jurisdiction to determine its
own competence, Kokott's opinion goes on to give it the jurisdiction to
consider the competence of arbitral tribunals as well, in direct contradiction to
the normal application of the competence-competence doctrine in arbitration:
That includes the right to examine the validity and scope of the
agreement put forward as a preliminary issue. If the court were
barred from ruling on such preliminary issues, a party could avoid
proceedings merely by claiming that there was an arbitration
agreement. At the same time a claimant who has brought the matter
before the court because he considers that the agreement is invalid or
inapplicable would be denied access to the national court. That would
be contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection which,
according to settled case-law, is a general principle of Community
law and one of the fundamental rights protected in the Community.4 2
Because Advocate General Kokott does not claim to change the law of
arbitration, she thus sets up a dual system of competence-competence, and a
jurisdictional race to the courthouse or arbitration tribunal.43 While this may
be consistent with the ECJ's jurisprudence in Gasserand Turnerregarding the
Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, it would extend that
jurisprudence in a manner that adds new problems by creating an additional set
of concerns for parties with a clear arbitration agreement. In doing so, it would
allow frustration of arbitration if a party first files a case in a court where the
decision on jurisdiction is likely to take substantial time (as happened in Gasser
in regard to parallel judicial proceedings).
40.

Allianz SpA, supra note 24, 55.

41.

Id. 57.

42.

Id. 58.

43.

For a discussion of the doctrine of competence/competence in arbitration, see ALAN REDFERN

El. AL., LAW AND PRACrICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION 5-39-5-42 (4th ed. 2004).
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It may be that the Gasser-Turnerline of cases gave Advocate General
Kokott little choice on the matter of application of the lis pendens rule of the
Brussels Regulation, and on the matter of anti-suit injunctions under the
Regulation. It is difficult, however, to understand why the decision of the
European Court of Justice should also set up a direct conflict with the law of
arbitration, and thereby create dual competence of courts and arbitral tribunals.
Her approach both raises concern with the future of respect for party autonomy
and the important role of arbitration agreements in international commerce, and
demonstrates the underlying fragility of the Court'sjurisprudence developed in
application of the lispendens rule of the Brussels Convention and Regulation.
D. Goshawk DedicatedLtd & Ors v. Life Receivables IrelandLtd.
On February 27, 2008, Mr. Justice Clark of the High Commercial Court
of Ireland issued his decision in Goshawk Dedicated Ltd & Ors v. Life
Receivables IrelandLtd," on a motion of Life Receivables to stay proceedings
in Ireland in favor of earlier proceedings involving the same parties and the
same claims, but brought in the State of Georgia in the United States. In doing
so, he acknowledged that the action commenced in Ireland was "a mirror image
of the Georgia proceedings," except for the presence of some additional parties
in Georgia, and that the Irish action was brought to seek a negative declaratory
judgment of non-liability.4 5
The problem for the court was that Life Receivables, the plaintiff in
Georgia and the defendant in Ireland, was domiciled in Ireland, thus bringing
into play the jurisdictional rules of Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation and
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice applying that article and the
Regulation's related provisions.
Without the Regulation, the common law doctrines of forum non
conveniens and lis alibipendens would normally have led the Irish court to
grant the stay in favor of proceedings in Georgia. Mr. Justice Clark, however,
was forced to acknowledge the implications of the ECJ holding in Owusu v.
Jackson,46 that
[t]he Brussels Convention precludes a court of a contracting state
from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that
convention on the ground that a court of a non-contracting state
44.
Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Life Receivables Ir. Ltd., [2008] I.L.Pr. 50 (Ir.), availableat 2008
WL 4975527; [2008] IEHC 90. The Goshawk case was referred to the European Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling on interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation on January 30, 2009. Goshawk Dedicated
Ltd & Ors v. Life Receivables Il. Ltd, [2009] IESC 7.
45.

Id. at 820.

46.

Case C 281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-138.
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would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action, even if
the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the
proceedings have no connecting factor to any other Contracting
State.47

Even though Owusu had not addressed the specific question at issue in
Goshawk, Mr. Justice Clark found that it controlled the outcome. Thus,
Given the clear statements to be found in Owusu to the effect that the
Brussels Regulation does not permit of the exercise of broad
discretionary powers for the purposes of declining a jurisdiction
which would otherwise arise under Article 2, it seems unlikely that a
doctrine of lis alibipendenswhich conferred on the court the level of
discretion currently available under the common law, could survive
in tandem with the mandatory requirements of the Convention.4"

He then specifically rejected the argument that the Brussels Regulation
implied retention of a doctrine of lis alibi pendens for cases first initiated
outside the E.U.. Life Receivables had argued that 1) "as and between Member
' and 2) the
States, a strict application of the doctrine of lis pendens applies;"49
Regulation specifically allows effect to be given to judgments from the courts
of non-Member States by providing in Article 34(4) that a judgment from
within the E.U. should not be recognized, "[i]f it is irreconcilable with an
earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third State involving the
same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier
judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member
State addressed."5 Thus, at the level of principle, "there is recognition in the
Regulation of both the doctrine of lis pendens and the appropriateness of
affording recognition, in accordance with the private international law of the
relevant Member State, to third party state judgments." 51 This meant that the
issue for Mr. Justice Clark to decide was "whether the recognition afforded to
both... in the Regulation is sufficient to warrant a departure from what seems
to be the clear mandatory language of Article 2, as interpreted by the European
Court of Justice in Owusu."52 The decision was in the negative because of the
distinction between granting lis pendens effect to jurisdiction in the court of a

47.

Id. 46.

48.

Goshawk, 2008 I.L.Pr. at 828.

49.

Id. at 830.

50.

Id. at 831.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.
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Member State and the differing effect of doing so for a court outside the Union.
Within the Union, a Member State court is bound by the terms of the Brussels
Regulation in consideration of whether it hasjurisdiction. A court from outside
the Union is not so bound, and may base its jurisdiction on grounds not
available in the Regulation, and without the control found in the overview of
the European Court of Justice.
Mr. Justice Clark noted that many commentators have challenged Owusu
and other decisions of the ECJ interpreting the Brussels Regulation, but found
it not to be his role to determine what the law should be under a perfect system.
Rather, it was to determine what the law is under the clear guidance of the
European Court of Justice.53 The result is further demonstration of the
domination of civil law concepts within the Brussels Regulation system. Mr.
Justice Clark admitted (without criticism) that the Court of Justice had found
civil law principles to control over common law doctrines through the
interesting proposition that, had the states party to the Brussels Convention laid
down a clear rule at the time of the accession of the UK and Ireland to the
Convention, it would have been what the majority would have wanted. The
idea that treaties (and now internal Regulations) should be interpreted to
include any rule that the majority of the parties to the treaty would want (but
did not include in the treaty when the consent of all parties was required),
seems questionable at best, but has become part of the bedrock of the
jurisprudence of the Brussels Convention and Regulation.54
The Goshawk decision is particularly interesting when set alongside a
French decision of March 6, 2008, in which, according to one commentator,
"the Paris Court of Appeal agreed to decline jurisdiction in order to enable the
plaintiffs to go back to California and resume the proceedings that they had
initiated there."55 This apparent approval of discretionary ability to decline
jurisdiction by the court of a civil law country provides interesting contrast with
the direction assumed for European law by the Irish court in Goshawk.
E. JapanAccedes to the UN. Sales Convention
On July 1, 2008, Japan deposited its instrument of accession to the United
Nations (U.N.) Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) 6 This means the Convention will go into effect for Japan on August
53.

Goshawk, 2008 I.L.Pr. at 826.

54.
For a discussion of the European Court's earlier decisions in this area, see Brand, supra note
8, at 47-49.
55.
Posting of Gilles Cuniberti to www.conflictoflaws.net, http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/frenchcourt-declines-jurisdiction-to-transfer-dispute-back-to-us-court/ (Mar. 27, 2008).
56.
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 59 [hereinafter Sales Convention].
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1, 2009." This change in Japanese position on the CISG was explained prior
to Japan's accession, by Professor Hiroo Sono as follows:
Japan has reversed its course and is now preparing to accede to the
CISG. What brought about this change? The most direct reason is that
the congested legislative agenda have somewhat cleared and the
[Ministry of Justice] is now able to devote their manpower to this task
again.58
A more indirect reason, but an equally important one, is the
phenomenal success of the CISG 59 .... Further, the MOJ has now
started working on the revision of the Obligations Law of the Civil
Code. That decision was made in order to adapt the Code to the
social and economic change that took place since its enactment more
than a century ago. However, this decision was also stimulated either
directly or indirectly in part by the success of the CISG. It is only
natural that the CISG will have impact on this upcoming revision6 .
The major trading companies are also beginning to change their
attitude toward the CISG, now that they have discovered that the
CISG is being used in a large part of the world. They are finding out
that the CISG can curtail costs of dealing with diverse domestic laws,
as well as transactions costs associated with negotiating choice-oflaw clauses ....

61

This brings the total of CISG contracting states to seventy-two, 62 and
leaves the United Kingdom, Brazil, and India as the major trading nations that
are not Contracting States. While this development is a matter of international
private law, it clearly fits within the scope of private international law matters
as more broadly defined in U.S. practice.
Japanese accession to the CISG demonstrates the success of international
private law unification through treaties. U.S. participation in the Convention
negotiations in Vienna in 1980, and U.S. implementation of the Convention in
1988, was accomplished entirely at the federal level, and did not involve
legislation at the state level, despite the fact that sales law is otherwise a state
(not a federal) matter. The success of the CISG has demonstrated how federal

57.
58.
(2008).

Id.
Hiroo Sono, Japan'sAccession to the CISG: The Asia Factor,20 PACE N'L L. REv. 105, 108

59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 109.

61.

Id.

62.

Sales Convention, supra note 56.
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implementation of treaties dealing with matters previously dealt with under
state law may be accomplished to the benefit of all those who will use, and be
subject to, the law.
F. Medellin v. Texas
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Medellin v. Texas,6" while dealing
with a matter generally covered under public international law, could have
major influence on the future development of private international law in the
United States. Jos6 Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the 1993 rape and murder
of two teenagers.' When arrested, he was given his Miranda warnings and
then signed a written confession.65 He was not informed by the arresting
officers (or by anyone else) of his rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular relations to notify the Mexican Consulate of his detention.66
Medellin did not raise any claims regarding his Convention rights at trial
or on direct appeal in the state court proceedings. Subsequently, however, as
a named party in the Case ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. U.S.) before the International Court of Justice, 67 and in habeas
corpus proceedings for post conviction relief, Medellin did raise the Vienna
Convention claims.6 8 In Avena, the International Court of Justice determined
that Article 36(b) of the Vienna Convention had been violated,69 and that the
United States was obligated "to provide, by means of its own choosing, review

63.

128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).

64.

Id.at 1354.

65.

Id.

66.
Id.Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,1963,21 U.S.T.77,596 U.N.T.S. 261;
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention, Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. Article 36 (l)(b) of the Vienna Convention includes the following
language regarding the rights of such a person:
b)
ifhe so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed
to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall
be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
subparagraph.

Id.
67.

See 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).

68.

Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1354.

69.

Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 53-55.
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and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican
nationals," 7 regardless of state procedural rules.7
Subsequent to the Avena decision, the U.S. Supreme Court, in SanchezLlamas v. Oregon,7 2 held that state default rules prevented such reconsideration
when the Convention issues were raised only in state habeas corpus
proceedings brought after conviction and direct appeal." In doing so, the Court
specifically rejected the rationale of the ICJ that the default by the defendants
in raising the Convention claims in the original proceedings was "because of
the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation under
Article 36," and thus, "prevented [U.S. courts] from attaching any legal
significance to the fact that foreign governments were kept from assisting their
nationals in their defense."74 The parties in Sanchez-Llamas had not been
defendants specifically named in the Avena decision of the ICJ.
President George W. Bush issued a Memorandum to the Attorney General
on February 28, 2005, in which he stated:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and laws of the United States ofAmerica; that the
United States of America will discharge its international obligations
under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
70.

Id. at 72.

71.

Id.at 56-57.

72.

548 U.S. 331 (2006).

73.

Id. at 350-51:
The general rule in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim
on direct appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review .....
Like many
States, Virginia applies a similar rule in state postconviction proceedings, and did so
here to bar Bustillo's Vienna Convention claim. Normally, in our review of state--court
judgments, such rules constitute an adequate and independent state-law ground
preventing us from reviewing the federal claim.

Id.
The argument that a treaty could trump the procedural default rule had first been raised and rejected
in regard to the Vienna Consular Convention in Breardv.Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (percuriam).
The Court there found such a treaty supremacy argument to be
'plainly incorrect,' for two reasons. First, we observed, 'it
has been recognized in
international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that
State.' Furthermore, we reasoned that while treaty protections such as Article 36 may
constitute supreme federal law, this is 'no less true of provisions of the Constitution
itself, to which rules of procedural default apply.'
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 351-52 (quoting Breard,523 U.S. at 375).
74.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497,191 (Judgment of June 27); see Avena,
2004 I.C.J., at 113.
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States of America) (Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general
principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals
addressed in that decision.75

When the Medellin case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on writ of
certiorari, the Court rejected claims based both on international law represented
by the decision of the International Court of Justice and on executive power to
implement that international law in the domestic realm, stating, "[w]e conclude
that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes directly
enforceable federal law that preempts state limitations on the filing of
successive habeas petitions."76
The holding ultimately was based on the role of state criminal procedure
default rules. Nonetheless, the opinion includes extended discussion of the
doctrine of self-executing treaties and of the President's authority (or lack
thereof) to impose international legal principles on the states. Although the
holding is more about federalism and separation of powers, the decision could
have a major impact on the role of treaties in U.S. law if the dicta of Chief
Justice Roberts' majority opinion is applied in determining the outcomes in
future cases. In that dicta, the opinion reviews the dualist approach to
international law ensconced in U.S. jurisprudence,77 acknowledging that the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, it's Optional Protocol, the U.N.
Charter, and decisions of the International Court of Justice to which the United
States is a party, are all binding upon the United States as a nation.
Nonetheless, it determines that the latter three create no law that can be relied
upon by private parties in U.S. courts.78 Unlike prior cases interpreting the
doctrine of self-execution, the opinion seems to require that, for treaty language
to be the "Law of the Land" under Article VI of the United States Constitution,

75.
Memorandum from George W. Bush on Compliance with the Decision of the International
Court ofJustice in Avena to the Attorney General (Feb. 28,2005), reprintedin John R. Crook, Contemporary
Practiceof the UnitedStates, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 489 (2005).
76.

Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1353.

No one disputes that the Avena decision-a decision that flows from the treaties
through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna
Convention disputes-constitutes an internationallaw obligation on the part of the
United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute
binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. The question we confront here
is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that the
judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.
Id.at 1356 (emphasis in original).
77.

78.

Id. at 1349.
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either Congress must clearly state that result in implementing legislation, or the
treaty language itself must explicitly prescribe self-executing effect.
The language of the opinion could (mistakenly, I hope) be read to reduce
the treaty portion of the Supremacy Clause to a nullity. If implementing
legislation is used, it is the Article I power of Congress that makes the resulting
rule the "Law of the Land" as legislation, not as a treaty. On the other hand, if
the only way for treaty language itself to be applicable in U.S. courts is if that
language explicitly requires self-execution, the fact that other nations use
different methods to make treaties applicable domestically (or may not do so at
all) will make the negotiation of future treaties incredibly difficult. If the U.S.
Executive Branch desires self-executing effect, its intent alone may not be
enough under Chief Justice Roberts' language, and explicit language of selfexecution in the treaty is unlikely to garner the consent of our treaty partners.
Conventions that directly create rules applicable to private-party
transactions have language intended to be self-executing. Under Medellin,
however, that language alone may not be enough to create the intended result.
In stating that "[t]he responsibility for transforming an international obligation
arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress,"79
the opinion indicates that it is for Congress to determine treaty intent, and the
President cannot do so alone. The case also leaves in doubt whether any treaty
ratified by the United States after the President receives the advice and consent
of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, will be enforceable in U.S. courts
absent further Congressional language in implementing legislation. What is left
of the Article VI supremacy clause for treaties is, at best, uncertain.
G. Hall Street Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.
In HallStreet Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel,Inc.,8 a convoluted procedural
history brought a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate a lease dispute to consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court. The question before the Court was
whether the Federal Arbitration Act section 10 and 11 grounds for review of
arbitration awards are exclusive, or whether parties may agree to allow review
on additional grounds.8' The arbitration clause in question provided that,

[t]he United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter
judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by
vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate,
modify or correct any award: i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts

79.

Id.at 1368 (citations omitted).

80.

128 S.Ct. 1396 (2008).

81.

9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1947).
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or ii) where the arbitrator's
are not supported by substantial evidence;
82
conclusions of law are erroneous.
Justice Souter authored the opinion for a six justice majority of the Court,
holding that the statutory grounds for vacatur and modification of an arbitral
award are exclusive and may not be supplemented by contract. The decision
resolves a conflict among the circuits, 3 but may not end the debate on how the
Federal Arbitration Act does or should limit party autonomy.
Justice Souter began by stating that "Congress enacted the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a
'national policy favoring [it] and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal
footing with all other contracts." 84 In summarizing the effect of the FAA on
judicial review of arbitration, he then stated that, "[u]nder the terms of § 9, a
court 'must' confirm an arbitration award 'unless' it is vacated, modified, or
corrected 'as prescribed' in §§ 10 and 11. Section 10 lists grounds for vacating
an award, while § 11 names those for modifying or correcting one., 8 5 Neither
includes the two grounds provided in the parties' arbitration agreement in the
Hall Street case.
The opinion first rejects the argument that earlier decisions of the Court
supported the position that the FAA grounds for vacating or modifying an
award are not exclusive, 6 and then goes on to reject as well the argument that
the FAA policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards
requires (or at least allows) parties the ability to provide additional bases for
review. While Justice Souter's textual analysis of the FAA finds that no
82.

Hall Street Assoc., 128 S.Ct. at 1400-01.

The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that parties may not contract for expanded
judicial review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-BacheTrade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d
987, 1000 (C.A.9 2003); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (C.A.10
2001). The First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, meanwhile, have held that parties
may so contract. See PuertoRico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31
(C.A. 1 2005); Jacada(Europe), Ltd. v. InternationalMarketingStrategies,Inc., 401
F.3d 701, 710 (C.A.6 2005); Roadway PackageSystem, Inc. v. Kayser,257 F.3d 287,
288 (C.A.3 2001); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
64 F.3d 993,997 (C.A.5 1995). The Fourth Circuit has taken the latter side of the split
in an unpublished opinion, see Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (1997),
while the Eighth Circuit has expressed agreement with the former side in dicta, see
UHC Management Co. v. ComputerSciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997-998 (1998).
Id. at 1403, n.5.
83.

84. Hall StreetAssoc., 128 S.Ct. at 1402 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing,Inc. v. Cardegna,546
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
85.

Id. at 1402.

86.

Id. at 1403-04.

87.

Id. at 1404-05.
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language in the statute indicates an intent to allow bases of review beyond those
found in § 10 and 11, it is not likely to satisfy everyone on the question of
whether parties to arbitration should have the ability to provide such flexibility.
The policy in favor of arbitration enhances party autonomy in the
resolution of private disputes. If parties have the ability to choose arbitration
over litigation, and to design the arbitration mechanism they so choose, it is
arguable that they should also have the ability to determine the full contours of
that choice, including the extent to which errors by arbitrators should be subject
to judicial scrutiny. The debate about whether not having this ability will lead
some parties to reject arbitration entirely because of the limits on flexibility, or
to embrace it further for its finality and predictability, will not be terminated by
the decision in Hall Street. What does seem clear, however, is that if a
preference for greater party autonomy than the Court has recognized in Hall
Street is to be the law, it will require legislative action in the form of an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act.
Arbitration deserves attention in private international law circles because
of its impact on jurisdiction and the concerns that parallel the recognition and
enforcement of judgments. While Hall Street involved domestic, and not
international, arbitration, its impact may be felt in the international realm, and
its implications for concerns of party autonomy may well expand beyond the
case itself. Those same concerns for party autonomy are regularly reflected in
decisions on jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments. Unlike most traditional private international law rules in the
United States, however, the law of arbitration has been federalized through the
Federal Arbitration Act88 and the New York Convention.89 Thus, if the holding
in Hall Street is to be changed by legislation, that result may be accomplished
through a single federal law, and it will not be necessary to change the law of
all of the states.
H. Alpine Atlantic Asset ManagementA G v. Comstock
While a Federal District Court decision from Kansas is not likely to make
many top ten lists of annual developments, Alpine Atlantic Asset Management
AG v. Comstock makes the list here because of the way in which it so clearly
illustrates the desirability of the subject of items 9 and 10 on the list: the 2005
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. In a case between a Swiss
plaintiff and a Kansas defendant, the defendant sought to have the case
dismissed so it could be heard in Switzerland, on the basis of a choice of court

88.

9 U.S.C. § 1.

89.

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 39.
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agreement and the doctrine offorum non conveniens.90 The court engaged in
a fullforum non conveniens analysis, despite the existence of an employment
contract clause stating that "[t]he ordinary courts at the domicile of the
Company [Switzerland] shall have exclusive jurisdiction," and the fact that
most of the causes of action arose out of the contractual relationship or directly
out of Swiss law. The court thus avoided what might have been a rather simple
choice of court analysis. 9'
In applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, the court followed the
apparently unique approach laid out by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal in
Yavuz v. 61 MM,Ltd.,92 which adds a second "threshold question," before
engaging in a balancing of private and public interest factors: "the court must
first answer 'two threshold questions in theforum non conveniens determination: first, whether there is an adequate alternative forum in which the
defendant is amenable to process, and second, whether the foreign law
applies."' 93 Despite this approach to the initial inquiry regarding the existing
of an alternative forum, the court later revisited the application of foreign law
in balancing public interest factors, finding it to be a relevant factor in favor of
litigation in a Swiss forum.
The analysis in the Comstock case presents a clear argument for United
States adoption of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.
While the Convention does not apply to employment contracts,94 and thus the
particular facts would not be covered under the Convention, the general
analysis presented by the court demonstrates the value of the Convention in
similar circumstances not excluded from Convention scope. Under Article 6
of the Convention, "[a] court of a Contracting State other than that of the
chosen court shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice
90.

Alpine Atlantic Asset Management AG v. Comstock, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (D. Kan.

91.

For reviews of U.S. cases addressing motions to dismiss based on the doctrine offorum non
ScoTr JABLONSKI, FORUM

2008).

conveniens when a choice of court agreement exists, see RONALD A. BRAND AND

NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE
OF COURT AGREEMENTS, 191-203 (2007), and Hannah L. Buxbaum, Forum Selection in International

Contract Litigation:the Role ofJudicialDiscretion,12 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. &DISP. RESOL. 185, 195-55
(2004).
92.

465 F.3d 418, 426 (10th Cir. 2006).

93.
Id The court further broke down the "adequate alternative forum" requirement into
consideration of whether the Swiss forum was "available" and whether it was "adequate." Availability was
determined to exist if the defendant is amenable to service of process in the foreign forum. Adequacy does
not require that the alternative forum provide the same relief as an American court and other courts had found
that Swiss courts provide an adequate alternative forum for contract and tort claims. See id. at 1276.
94.
See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, art. 2(l)(b), June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M.
1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid--98 (last visited Mar. 1,
2009) [hereinafter Hague Convention] for the text of the Hague Convention.
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of court agreement applies" unless certain very limited exceptions exist.95
Those exceptions do not allow for the application of the doctrine offorum non
conveniens.96 The Convention would thus end the unnecessary application of
forum non conveniens analysis when an exclusive choice of court agreement
exists, saving time and costs in litigation.
I. U.S. and EuropeanStatements andPositionson the Hague Convention
on Choice of CourtAgreements
While only Mexico has so far deposited the necessary instrument to
become a Contracting State to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements,97 developments in the fall of 2008 bode well for the treaty's future.
First, on September 5, the European Commission presented a Proposal for a
Council Decision on the signing by the European Community of the Convention
on Choice-of-Court Agreements.9" This is the first step toward ratification or
accession in order for the Community (and thus its 27 Member States) to
become a Contracting State. The Proposal for a Council Decision on the
signing by the European Community of the Convention on Choice-of-Court
Agreements,99 reads as follows:
Article I
Subject to a possible conclusion at a later date, the signing of the
Convention on Choice-of-Court agreements concluded at The Hague
on 30 June 2005 is hereby approved on behalf of the Community.
The President of the Council is hereby authorised to designate the
person(s) empowered to sign, on behalf of the European Community,
the Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements concluded at the
Hague on 30 June 2005, subject to the conditions set out in Article 2.
Article 2
When signing the Convention, the Community shall make the
following declaration in accordance with Article 30 of the
Convention:
'The European Community declares, in accordance with Article
30 of the Convention, that it exercises competence over all the matters
governed by this Convention. Its Member States will not sign, ratify,
95.

Id.at art. 6

96.
See id.
at art. 5(2). Article 5(2) also prevents a court from dismissing a case based onforum
non conveniens when it is the court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement.
97.
HCCH Status Table, http:/hcch.e-vision.nl/index en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009).
98.
Commission Proposalfor a Council Decision on the Signing by the European Community of
the Convention on Choice-of-CourtAgreements, COM (2008) 538 final (Sept. 5, 2008).
99.

Id.
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accept or approve the Convention, but shall be bound by the
Convention by virtue of its conclusion by the European Community.
For the purpose of this declaration, the term 'European Community' does not include Denmark by virtue of Articles 1and 2 of the
Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community [and the United Kingdom and Ireland by virtue of Article 3 of
the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland,
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community]'." °

The Proposal for a Council Decision came after unofficial approval of the
Convention by the U.K. Financial Markets Committee.'0 ' The Committee
stated:
Overall, the FMLC endorses [the Commercial Bar Association's]
general approach and, in particular, its comment that "the general aim
of the project, namely to make exclusive choice of court agreements
as effective as possible, is one which is to be encouraged
strenuously..."1°2
Not long after the Commission recommendation to move forward on the
Convention, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice authorized U.S. signature for
the Convention.0 3 This will clear the way for the Convention to be submitted
to the United States Senate for its advice and consent so that U.S. ratification
may follow. It seems unlikely that the new administration would take a
contrary position on the Convention.
With both the United States and the European Community seemingly
ready to move forward on the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court Agree-

100.

Id.at art. 2.

FINANCIAL MARKETS LAW COMMITTEE, ISSUE 107: BRUSSELS 1 REGULATION ARTICLE 23
CASES, LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION AND SUGGESTED
SOLUTIONS, (July 2008), http://www.fmlc.org/papers/Issuel07assessment.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
101.

102.

Id. at 44-45.

103. There exists no public announcement of this decision. The author received word of it through
the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. State Department Legal Advisor, John
Bellinger, on the last day of the Bush Administration, signed the 2005 Hague Convention on behalf of the
United States, indicating the U.S. intent to move toward ratification. See Hague Conference on Private
International Law, June 30,2005, status table http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-conventions.status&cid
=98#legend (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). See also Martin George, United States Signs Hague Convention
on Choice of Court Agreements (Jan. 21, 2005), http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/united-states-signs-hagueconvention-on-choice-of-court-agreements/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2009).
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ments, greater incentive will exist for other states to follow in order to become
a part of the regime to be created by the Convention. Wide ratification and
accession will give Choice-of-Court agreements and resulting judgments greater
recognition and place them on a more even footing with arbitration agreements
and awards under the highly successful New York Arbitration Convention.
IV. LEGAL SYSTEM MAGNETS AND CENTRIFUGES

While the United States has indicated its intent to sign the Hague
Convention on Choice-of-Court Agreements, what is not clear is the method by
which it will make the Convention effective in U.S. law. Such a convention
clearly is designed to create a system of rights and obligations for private
parties. Thus, through some Constitutional mechanism it must become law
applicable in U.S. courts to disputes involving private parties. The Medellin
decision raises doubts about whether this could be accomplished through the
doctrine of self-execution in the absence of some clear Congressional
statement.
During the Hague Convention negotiations, two other initiatives internal
to the United States and having implications for its ultimate application were
begun. The American Law Institute prepared a proposed federal statute on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments that would
federalize the law on such matters when a party from outside the United States
is involved in a suit."° The project was completed in 2005, providing a statute
that could result in greater predictability and uniformity in how courts throughout the United States deal with foreign litigants and foreign judgments." 5
The second parallel development was the creation in the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (now referred to as the
Uniform Law Commission, or ULC) of a new Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act.' 6 Also completed in 2005, this Act updates and
amends the 1963 Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, clearly
staking claim to a role for the states in the law of recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments.0 7 This process has continued with the creation of a ULC
104. For further discussion of this project, see Linda Silberman, A Different Challengeforthe ALl:
Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an InternationalTreaty, and an American Statute, 25 IND. L. J. 635

(2000).
105.

See generally AMERICAN LAW

INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN

JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

(2006).

106. Unif. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (2005), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ufinjra/2005final.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
107. Id. at Prefatory Note, Sec. 1, cmt. See generallyUnif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act of 1962, available at http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archiveslulc/fnact99/1920_69/ufnjra 62.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2009).
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Working Group charged with preparing a position on implementation of the
2005 Hague Convention in a manner that involves the states and retains a role
for state law alongside the Convention rules. It is clear from that process that
ULC representatives favor a clear role for the states in the implementation of
the Hague Convention. What is not clear is the Constitutional foundation for
that role. While Erie v. Tompkins'0 8 and Klaxon v. Stentor"9 have been applied
to result in the application of state conflict of laws rules in federal district
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction, those decisions do not appear to require
that conflicts law be state law. Even if they were read to require that result, it
would likely only be so for internal state-to-state conflicts, and not for external
relations in the realm of private international law. Neither has there been a
demonstration that state law would provide a better product in terms of
predictability of application or uniformity of result for the end user of the legal
rules contained in the Hague Convention.
It is too early at the end of 2008 to determine just what form U.S.
implementation of the Hague Choice-of-Court Convention will take. What is
clear, however, is that there will be substantial pressure for a state role in that
implementation, and that there will be a complete draft text of a state statute
designed to carry out the binding treaty obligations of the United States when
private party Choice-of-Court Agreements become the subject of litigation in
U.S. courts, whether state or federal.
V. CONCLUSION

The developments listed above show that in 2008 both the centralization
of private international law in Europe and the legal foundation for the
dispersion of private international law in the United States gained momentum.
The Rome I and II Regulations, along with ECJ and national judicial decisions
applying the Brussels Regulation, demonstrate the clear migration of
competence for private international law in the E.U. from Member State
governments to the institutions of the European Community. They also clarify
the solidification of the domination of civil law approaches to private
international law within the E.U. At the same time, the Medellin decision of the
United States Supreme Court, and the Uniform Law Commissioners' efforts to
draft a uniform act by which to implement the Hague Convention on Choice-ofCourt Agreements, demonstrate a parallel reduction in the ability of the U.S.
Executive Branch to participate in the development of private international law
on the multilateral level and to implement that law internally.
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The ULC draft uniform act for implementing the Hague Convention is
indicative of the political centrifuge in play in the United States that contrasts
with the political magnet effect of the E.U., and the resulting centralization of
private international law competence in the institutions of the European
Community. It is not hard to see which of these two processes is more likely
to lead to uniformity of interpretation and the resulting predictability of results
in private international law and private transnational litigation. Neither is it
difficult to extrapolate from these parallel developments the resulting effect on
the impact each of the United States and the European Community is likely to
have in multilateral institutions when negotiating new legal instruments. The
E.U. enters the competition for global legal rules with a distinct advantage
resulting from the traditional influence its Member States have had in the
export of civil law legal systems. The addition of a centralized program of
development of both its internal and external rules of private international law,
especially when faced with an apparent growing dispersal of competence for the
same rules in the United States, is likely to create a new balance of influence
in global relationships. In this regard, the developments of 2008, on both sides
of the Atlantic, indicate that the ceding of leadership to Europe by the United
States is not only continuing but gaining momentum.
The growing decentralization of treaty implementation in the United States
has significance beyond just the future application of treaty rules in U.S. courts.
Developments such as the Rome I and I Regulations, and the cases- in both
the European Court of Justice and national courts-applying the Brussels
Regulation, demonstrate the domination of civil law principles of private
international law over the common law doctrines of the United Kingdom and
Ireland. This is, in part, a result of the late entry of the United Kingdom and
Ireland into a system of rules that was initiated by civil law countries. By the
time the common law states of Europe became involved in that process, they
were no longer able to prevent the instruments of the European Community
from being dominated by civil law approaches.
If the development of private international law rules in and by the United
States is fragmented among the states, and defined by a dispersal of authority
for its development and implementation, then the harmonization of rules on a
multilateral scale will leave the United States in much the same weak position
vis-a-vis the rest of the world as the United Kingdom and Ireland have been visa-vis continental (civil law) Europe. We will have failed to stake out a clear
position on rules to be advanced in the relevant forum for the negotiation of
multilateral instruments, and the movement for globalized rules based on the
civil law model of the E.U. will easily dominate the global private international
law agenda. If you believe the civil law world "has it right" on all of its rules
of private international law, then that may be a good thing, and the resulting
rapid evolution to that result may be good as well. If, on the other hand, you
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find problems in the absence of the application of doctrines such as due process
in determining judicial jurisdiction and judicial discretion in the exercise of
jurisdiction, then you might be concerned with current trends.

